Should absolute or comparative measures be used to assess a respondent's preferences, values, or attitudes? Consider, for example, a study on the importance of values. A researcher may ask respondents to rate each value item on a scale with response categories ranging from very unimportant to very important. Judgments of this type are called absolute because each value item can be assigned to one of the scale categories separately without explicit comparisons to other items. In contrast, the researcher could ask respondents to rank the value items in terms of their importance. Such a judgment is called relative because it focuses directly on the differences between the values and requires a respondent to assess whether one value is more or less important than another value. As a result, category labels as in the case of rating scales are not required.
Current research practice favors absolute measures in the form of ratings. Perhaps the main reasons for this situation are that comparative measures such as pairwise comparisons or rankings are more difficult to collect and lack information about the origin of the item evaluations. One item may be judged more positively than another in a comparison, but this result does not allow any conclusions about whether either of the items are attractive or unattractive. Although one respondent may find both items attractive and another respondent may dislike both items, their comparative judgments can be identical and thus do not facilitate any inferences about the absolute evaluations of the items. This ipsative characteristic (Cattell, 1944) of comparative judgments requires special care in the application of statistical techniques (Chan, 2003) . For instance, factor-analytic methods will lead to incorrect conclusions about the underlying individual-differences structure in comparative judgment data if their ipsative nature is not taken into account (ten Berge, 1999) .
Over the years, it has become accepted among researchers that only absolute judgments can provide information about the scale origins of individual item evaluations. This article demonstrates that such a belief is unnecessarily restrictive. It is shown that a scale origin can also be identified by augmenting comparative judgments in specific ways without requiring absolute judgments. Three distinct approaches are presented that can be used for this purpose. These approaches are based on specific assumptions about the judgmental process that can be subjected to rigorous statistical tests. As a result, they provide useful insights about comparative assessments of items that would not be available otherwise. Moreover, they are easy to implement with multilevel software packages, such as HLM (Raudenbusch, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2000) , MIXOR (Hedeker & Gibbons, 1996) , Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2001) , and MLwiN (Rasbash et al., 2000) , and they require little additional effort on the side of the respondents.
A new look at comparative judgments is warranted because such judgments can have several distinct advantages over absolute measures. First, asking respondents to compare items with each other can avoid undesirable effects of idiosyncratic interpretations of such category labels as agree moderately, agree strongly, and so forth found in rating forms. Statistical methods that rely on the assumption that respondents interpret category labels in similar ways are prone to produce spurious results when this assumption is not met (Brady, 1989) . Unfortunately, little systematic research is available on designing rating scales to ensure that respondents understand in a precise and stable way the rating scale categories as well as agree sufficiently on their interpretation of the meaning of them. Krosnick and Fabrigar (in press ) provided an extensive review of the literature on this topic. Direct item comparisons can overcome many of the biases and possible pitfalls resulting from the poor design of rating scales.
1 Second, the typical number of response categories-between five and nine-of a rating scale limits the number of distinctions that can be made by a person. For example, when respondents are asked to rate the importance of different values, it is not unusual to observe that the majority of the values are judged as important or very important (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985; Rankin & Grube, 1980) . Groupings of items in the same response category provide little information about individual differences in item evaluations. When respondents are asked to express a choice in their item comparisons, tied judgments can be avoided completely, which may lead to a more informative and richer basis for understanding how individuals differ in their item assessments. Third, comparative judgments, for instance, in the form of paired comparisons, facilitate investigations of the degree to which respondents are consistent in their item evaluations. For example, when item j is preferred to item k, and item k is preferred to item h, we expect that item j is also preferred to item h. If a judge selects item h in the last comparison, then this indicates an intransitive cycle that may be useful in understanding the judgmental process (Tversky, 1969) . Much evidence has accrued over recent years to suggest that frequently respondents have difficulties appraising their values or preferences (Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) . Clearly, if respondents can be shown to be consistent in their judgments, one can have much greater confidence in the measurement of their values, attitudes, or preferences and the predictive value of derived item scales in further applications.
These advantages, in combination with the recent progress on statistical programs for the analysis of individual differences in paired comparison and ranking data (Böckenholt, 2001; Maydeu-Olivares, 2002) , suggest that comparative measures can be of much use in applied research, especially if methods are available that facilitate the joint analysis of relative and absolute evaluations of items. The proposed extensions facilitate such an approach by providing a framework for a quantitative assessment of the similarities and differences between absolute and relative evaluations.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, the scale origin problem is discussed in the analysis of comparative judgment data. Next, three methods for identifying the scale origin are presented. Although this presentation focuses on paired comparison data, the obtained results apply directly to other types of comparative judgments such as rankings. Paired comparisons are considered because they can be analyzed easily with currently available multilevel packages for logistic and probit models. The article concludes with a discussion of the main results.
The Scale Origin Problem in Paired
Comparison Data
In a paired comparison experiment, a judge is presented with pairs of items and asked to express a preference for one of the two items. A number of paired comparison models have been proposed in the literature to describe the underlying response process of a judge (David, 1988) . Perhaps because of their computational convenience and easy interpretation, Luce's (1959) and Thurstone's (1927) models have been used most frequently over the years.
The analysis of paired comparison data that are collected by asking judges to compare multiple item pairs should take into account that the data contain variation between individuals as well as momentary fluctuations within each person. A two-level representation provides a flexible framework to account for the within-and between-judges effects. The first level describes the stochastic variation in the responses of a single judge, and the second level represents the judges' variability in the assessment of the items. Böck-enholt (2001) discussed the two-level approach in detail. The following section presents the paired comparison model for an individual judge with emphasis on the scale origin problem. Subsequently, we focus on the second level by discussing the implications of the scale origin problem on the interpretation of the between-judges model parameters.
In a complete paired comparison experiment, participants are presented sequentially with J͑ J Ϫ 1͒ 2 item pairs and are asked to choose the item they prefer with respect to the given attribute (e.g., importance) for each pair. According to the random utility interpretation of paired comparison models, judges arrive at their choice by first determining the 1 There are other problems in using rating scales that result from difficult-to-test assumptions about the distances between adjacent response categories. The literature contains many examples questioning the standard assumption of equidistant response categories (Krosnick & Fabrigar, in press ). Although ordinal methods (van der Linden & Hambleton, 1997) are available for the analysis of rating scales, they rely on the less strong but still doubtful notion that intercategory distances are the same for all respondents. However, because this section focuses on the advantages of using comparative over absolute measures and not on problems in using rating scales, these issues are not pursued here.
underlying values of the two items under consideration and then selecting the item with the higher utility value. Because respondents may not always select the same item in repeated comparisons, a random error term is added to the comparison process. Specifically, letting ij and ik denote the mean evaluations of items j and k by person i, we can write the latent judgment outcome y ijk between two items as a difference between the respective mean evaluations:
Fluctuations in the evaluations of the two items j and k is captured by ⑀ ijk , which is assumed to be independently distributed for all item pairs. When ⑀ ijk follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 , the so-called Case V Thurstone model is obtained. Specifying a logistic distribution yields the Bradley-Terry-Luce model. However, in applications there is little to choose between these two specifications. Very large sample sizes are required to distinguish a normal from a logistic distribution function that share the same mean and variance (Camilli, 1994) . Differences between the Bradley-Terry-Luce and the Thurstonian model become apparent when more general cases of the Thurstonian model are considered with within-pair variances that are not equal for all or some of the pairs, that is, jk 2 lm 2 . Heiser and DeLeeuw (1981) discussed these cases and presented a rich set of geometric representations for such models.
Because the response of a judge is binary, the latent difference judgment y ijk has to be mapped onto the discrete response scale. When y ijk Ͼ 0, item j is preferred by person i, and, otherwise, item k is selected. For the Bradley-TerryLuce model, the selection of item j in a comparison between items j and k can then be expressed as
where ⌿٪ is a short form for the logistic distribution function 1 1 ϩ exp͓Ϫ٪͔ .
Similarly, for the Thurstonian model, we obtain
where ⌽٪ is a short form for the standard normal distribution function. the columns of A correspond to the items j, k, l, and m. The first row of A captures the comparison between items j and k and yields Equation 1 when including the error component. It is often a foregone conclusion that the mean evaluations i differ among respondents. A tractable and frequently plausible assumption is that the individual item evaluations i can be represented by a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector ϭ ( 1 , 2 , . . . , J ) and covariance matrix ⍀ describing the average evaluation of the items and their variability, respectively, in the population of judges. Thus, each judge can assess the items differently, but the individual differences in the item assessments are expected to follow a normal distribution. The latter assumption may be questionable in some applications. For example, in elections it is usual to observe several groups of voters with distinct opinions about the political candidates. In this case, it may be more appropriate to represent the heterogeneous population of voters by several distinct normal distributions to account for the possibility that voters differ in their perception of the candidates. More detail on the between-judges or second level of paired comparison models is given in Appendix A.
The scale origin problem in comparative judgments arises because only differences between item evaluations, not the absolute evaluations, are observed. Thus, the outcome that one item is more preferred than another item does not allow any conclusions about the absolute attractiveness of either item. Specifically, we can add a constant c i to each of the item values in Equation 1 to increase or decrease their attractiveness. However, because this constant cancels out when computing the difference between the scale values, these changes in the attractiveness of the items cannot be inferred from the difference judgment:
It follows from Equation 5 that comparative judgments do not contain information about an item's absolute attractiveness. Moreover, because the constant c i is person specific, it is only possible to compare individuals in terms of their relative judgments without knowing whether they differ in their absolute assessments of the items. Because the individual scale origin cannot be identified, one of the mean evaluations can be subtracted from the other scale values without loss of generality. For example, we may subtract im from ij , ik , il , and im in Equation 4. This approach is equivalent to setting im ϭ 0 and omitting the last column of A. Although subtracting one of the scale values from the remaining ones reduces the number of parameters, it also introduces difficult interpretational problems because all scale values have to be interpreted relative to the subtracted scale value. Specifically, by setting iJ ϭ 0, only (J Ϫ 1) item scale values and, consequently, a [(J Ϫ 1) ϫ (J Ϫ 1)] covariance matrix ⌺ capturing the variation of the reduced set of scale values can be estimated, not the original J item means or the corresponding (J ϫ J) item-covariance matrix ⍀.
This loss of information about the individual scale origins complicates both the analysis and interpretation of comparative judgment data. The covariance matrix ⌺ contains information only about how individuals differ in their evaluations of the items relative to the subtracted item. For example, when the effect of item J is set to 0 in the design matrix A, the jth diagonal element of ⌺, jj , represents the variation in the differences ( ij Ϫ iJ ). In terms of the elements of the full-item covariance matrix ⍀, jj can be written as
From this relationship two results follow. First, jj cannot be uniquely interpreted in terms of the original item variances and covariances without simplifying assumptions about the structure of ⍀. Second, the covariance structure of ⌺ depends on the choice of the reference item J. Because different selections of the reference item lead to different covariance structures, much care needs to be taken in statistical analyses of ⌺ to ensure that the results do not depend on this choice. The interpretation of the covariance between two difference judgments is even more complex and possible only for special covariance structures of ⍀.
As an illustration of these problems, consider the following covariance matrix ⍀ for J ϭ 3 items:
ͪ , (6) with a negative covariance (Ϫ.125) between the first two items and a positive covariance between the second and third items (.125). When the scale values of the third item are set to 0, the corresponding covariance matrix ⌺ can be written as
Clearly, it is impossible to recover ⍀ from ⌺. In particular, one cannot infer from ⌺ whether any of the item pairs covary positively or negatively. To overcome these interpretational and data-analytic difficulties, it seems desirable to consider methods that facilitate the estimation of ⍀ instead of ⌺. The next section introduces three different methods that may prove useful for this purpose.
Determining the Scale Origin in Comparative Judgments
From Equation 5, one may conclude that paired comparisons can be used only to measure relative, not absolute, item evaluations. However, this view is unnecessarily restrictive. By appropriately augmenting the paired comparison design matrix, it is possible to obtain the full item mean and covariance structure. This section discusses three different approaches that may allow identifying the origin of the individual scales. Each of these approaches is based on additional assumptions that go beyond the basic paired comparison paradigm. As a result, it is important to test whether these assumptions hold in any given application. The following presentation explains the underlying assumptions and then discusses how to test them statistically.
On the basis of the first approach, we can obtain the scale origin by combining absolute and relative judgments. Here the underlying hypothesis is that the absolute and relative judgments yield the same item scale values. It is shown that although only one absolute judgment is required to identify the scale origin, multiple absolute judgments are necessary to test whether the hypothesis of equal scale values is in agreement with the data.
The second approach is well suited when the scale origin can be determined a priori. For example, in the context of a decision task the status quo position of a respondent can be taken as a natural zero point. In general, the selection of an a priori scale origin depends on the chosen application. Care must be taken that there is no ambiguity among respondents in the interpretation of the scale origin. For example, when scaling uncertainty statements (Wallsten & Budescu, 1995) , one could argue that respondents agree on the interpretation of the statement that Event A has a 50 -50 chance of occurring and use this statement as the scale's zero point for comparison to such other uncertainty statements as Event A is "probable" or that it has a "good chance" of happening.
According to the third method, the scale origin can be inferred by asking respondents to choose between item bundles (consisting of multiple items) in addition to single items. The item origin can then be estimated by specifying how respondents evaluate item bundles. Assumptions about the item integration functions for a bundle are testable and can be written in the form of statistical hypotheses.
Each of the three approaches augments the design matrix in Equation 4 in such a way that it becomes a full-rank matrix. In this case, both the mean values of the items and the corresponding covariance matrix ⍀ can be estimated. In the following, it is also discussed how to test additional assumptions that are required in identifying the scale origin. As an important side result, these tests provide valuable insights concerning how respondents arrived at their subjective evaluations of the items.
Combining Absolute and Relative Judgments
This section considers the identification of a scale origin by combining both absolute and relative judgments. It is shown that the scale origin can be located by asking respondents to provide only one binary rating in addition to the comparative judgments. However, this approach does not allow testing the underlying assumption that indeed comparative and absolute judgments are a result of the same process. A statistical test of this hypothesis is obtained by including multiple absolute and comparative judgments. This test is powerful and facilitates detailed analyses of the similarities and differences between absolute and comparative judgments. Little systematic work is available that focuses on the conditions under which absolute and relative judgments give rise to similar item evaluations. One important advantage of the proposed approach is that for the first time it provides a rigorous statistical framework to test for the hypothesis of equal evaluations in a within-subject setting. As a result, this method may prove useful in future studies that try to identify when relative and absolute judgments agree. Thurstone (1927) conceptualized comparative judgments as a difference between two simultaneous absolute judgments (see Equation 1). If absolute judgments follow the same response process as comparative judgments, additional binary judgments can identify the origin of an individual scale. Depending on the application, the person may find the single item attractive or unattractive, important or unimportant, and so on. Consistent with the specification of a comparative judgment in Equation 1, the latent (absolute) judgment outcome of item j is written as
where ⑀ ij captures the random variability in the evaluation process and ij represents person's i mean judgment of item j. For y ij less than 0, the first response category is selected; otherwise, the second response category is chosen. If the ij s in the binary judgments are equal to the corresponding ij s in the pairwise judgments, the origin of the response scale can be determined.
As an illustration of this approach, consider 
The columns of A i correspond to the items j, k, l, and m. The first six rows of A i contain the design matrix of the pairwise comparisons, and the remaining four rows correspond to the separate evaluations of the four items. The pair-and itemspecific error terms are specified to be independently distributed with means equal to 0 but possibly with different variance terms. For example, under the normal distribution assumption, the pair-specific terms may have variance jk 2 ϭ p 2 for all item pairs and j 2 ϭ S 2 for all single items with p 2 S 2 . The additional binary ratings coded in the last four rows of the design matrix A i make A i a full-rank matrix and thus allow identifying the items' mean vector and covariance matrix ⍀. At a minimum, only one absolute binary judgment is necessary to identify the origin of the latent judgments, but in this case it is not possible to test whether absolute and comparative judgments yield the same item scales. Only with multiple absolute ratings does such a test become feasible.
Suppose person i rates both items j and k. In this case, the null hypothesis that the difference between the two binary judgments is equal to the pairwise judgment of both items can be written as follows:
This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the maximumlikelihood goodness-of-fit statistics obtained from the nullhypothesis model with the reduced design matrix A (R) with the alternative model with the full design matrix A (F) , that is,
. (10) Thus, under the reduced model (given by A (R) ), absolute and comparative judgments are based on the same mean evaluations of the items j and k with y ij ϭ ij ϩ ⑀ ij and y ik ϭ ik ϩ ⑀ ik as written in the seventh and eighth rows of A (R) . In contrast, under the full model (given by A (F) ), these evaluations are allowed to be different because y ij ϭ ij ϩ ⑀ ij and y ik ϭ ik ϩ ⑀ ik . Because the two models given in Equation 10 are nested, difference chi-square tests (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) can be used to test the hypothesis that absolute and comparative judgments of the selected items yield the same mean evaluations.
For a comprehensive analysis of the similarities and differences between absolute and relative judgments, it is necessary to present all J items for the absolute judgments and J͑ J Ϫ 1͒ 2 items for the comparative judgments. In this case, it is possible to test the hypothesis of equal items means for absolute and comparative judgments for all item pairs. Because this approach is straightforward and easy to implement, it may prove to be of much use in a withinperson analysis of comparative and absolute item evaluations.
Specifying the Scale Origin A Priori
In some applications, the scale origin can be specified a priori. Consider, for example, decision situations in which a person has to choose between "doing nothing" or following a specific course of action. In this case, it seems meaningful to code the no-change or status quo option as a natural zero point that can serve as a reference for any comparisons. The notion that judgments are reference dependent has received much support in recent years (see Kahneman, 2003 , for a recent review). This work demonstrates that the perceived utility of a given state of wealth by a decision maker depends on this person's initial state of wealth. Thus, gains and losses are carriers of utilities rather than absolute levels of wealth. Although, in general, a priori selections of reference points require some care, reference points are defined easily in risky choice situations such as lotteries in which a respondent may gain an option (e.g., winning a consumer good) with a certain probability or gain nothing with the complementary probability. Similar situations arise in choices among (medical) treatment plans with probabilistic outcomes and insurance policies.
In the following, we consider the risky choice paradigm of Shuford, Jones, and Bock (1960) , who asked respondents to choose between two lotteries. In one lottery item j can be won with probability p s , and nothing otherwise, and in the other lottery item k can be won with probability p u , and nothing otherwise. These lotteries are written in abbreviated forms as (j, p s ) and (k, p u ), respectively. The probabilistic nature of the lottery outcomes is the crucial distinction from the more common nonrisky paired comparison studies in which respondents are asked to choose between two certain outcomes. In the probabilistic context, the status quo outcome (e.g., "winning nothing") defines the origin of the individual item utility scales in a natural way because an item that can be won is a gain relative to the status quo position.
Let i0 denote the mean evaluation of the status quo outcome. Then, if we set i0 ϭ 0, the comparative utility judgment of two lotteries (j, p s ) and (k, p u ) is given by
where ⑀ ij(p s )k(p u ) denotes the unsystematic response variability in the comparison between the two lotteries. Clearly, the interpretation of the scale value ij as deviation from the status quo is appealing. In gain situations, we expect scale values to be positive valued because they represent an improvement over the status quo. In gambles that involve losses, the scale values are expected to be negative valued but not necessarily equal to the corresponding scale values under a gain frame.
2
As a means of distinguishing a risky from a nonrisky choice mode, the winning probabilities are listed in parentheses next to the option label. According to expected utility (EU) theory (Luce, 2000) , the winning probabilities and the corresponding individual item means in Equation 11 are 2 Because this section focuses exclusively on gambles with positive outcomes, the notation does not explicitly distinguish between gain and loss utility scales. In general, however, this distinction is important and could be reflected by introducing Ϯ signs for gain and loss frames, respectively (e.g., by using ij (ϩ) for positive deviations from status quo). combined multiplicatively. This calculation can be readily accommodated by the paired comparison design matrix. As an illustration, consider the following scenario in which the options j, k, and l (e.g., three different vacation packages) are presented pairwise, first in a nonrisky presentation mode and, next, in the form of lotteries: 
The error terms ⑀ i are specified to be independently distributed with variance terms that may be different for comparisons in the risky and nonrisky choice mode. The three columns of the design matrix A i correspond to the three options j, k, and l. The top three rows of A i define the pairwise comparisons between the items (j, k), (j, l), and (k, l). For instance, the first row yields Equation 1. The remaining six rows of A i define the lottery pairs given by Equation 11. For example, the fourth row indicates person's i choice between the lotteries to win item j with probability .8 or nothing otherwise (j, .8) and to win item k with probability .2 or nothing otherwise (k, .2). The last row corresponds to the choice between the lotteries (k, .2) and (l, .8) with the latent judgment
The design matrix in Equation 12 is of full rank. Thus, although only difference judgments are observed, the mean evaluations and their covariance matrix are fully identified. This desirable feature is obtained already when one lottery comparison with p s p u is included in the design matrix.
A crucial assumption underlying Equation 12 is that utilities do not depend on whether they are derived from risky or riskless choices. This assumption may not hold when item evaluations elicited from a gamble include attitudes towards risk that would not be present in riskless item evaluations (Luce, 2000) . Fortunately, this assumption can be tested rigorously by comparing the item scale values estimated from the nonrisky choices with the ones estimated under the risky choice mode. Let ij and ij denote person's i evaluations of item j presented in the riskless and risky choice mode, respectively. If the choice mode does not affect the judgments, we expect that the null hypothesis
holds for all items. This hypothesis can be tested on the basis of maximum-likelihood goodness-of-fit statistics by comparing a full model that allows for different mean evaluations of the nonrisky and risky choice options to its reduced counterpart, Equation 12, that equates these mean evaluations. This nested model-comparison approach is identical to the one presented in the previous section for examining the equality of absolute and relative judgments.
Inferring the Scale Origin From Judgments of Item Bundles
A third possibility to estimate the full covariance matrix ⍀ is obtained by asking respondents to compare not only single items but also multiple items presented as a set or bundle. For example, item sets may consist of consumer goods (e.g., a keyboard and mouse bundle), multiple lotteries (Shanteau, 1975) , or different ability and motivation combinations of students trying out for college track (Anderson, 1981) . The first theoretical and experimental study on item bundles was reported by Gulliksen (1956) , who used as items the five entrées beef, lamb, pork, steak, and tongue, plus the 10 pairwise combinations of these entrées. Respondents were asked to choose between the single as well as the double entrées. In a related study by Thurstone and Jones (1957) , the stimuli consisted of five potential birthday gifts (briefcase, record player, pen and pencil set, desk lamp, dictionary), which were presented both separately and in pairwise combinations.
Investigations of how individuals evaluate multiple as opposed to single items have a long tradition in both psychology and economics. In his review of this area, Luce (2000) referred to it as the study of joint receipts to emphasize that gains and/or losses may need to be combined to arrive at an overall assessment of the attractiveness of an item bundle. Below it is shown that the origin of the item scale values can be determined provided the overall evaluation of an item bundle can be predicted by a given function of the separate item evaluations that constitute the item bundle. In this section, we focus on applications where the function is an additive combination of the item utilities. Although an additivity relation may hold at least approximately in many applications, it does not hold in general and should be subjected to an empirical test when possible. Details about such an additivity test for comparative judgments are therefore provided as well.
For notational purposes, it is convenient to use brackets for the representation of item bundles. For example, y il(jk) is the preference judgment of person i in the comparison of item l and the item bundle (jk) that consists of the items j and k. Similar to Equation 1, this judgment is decomposed into a difference between the mean evaluation of item l and the item bundle (jk),
where ⑀ il(jk) represents random response variability in the comparison process. More generally, when considering the items j, k, and l, the following pairs can be formed under the constraint that the same item does not occur in the item bundles that are being compared:
where the error terms ⑀ i are assumed to be independently distributed with means equal to 0 and variance terms that may differ for single-item and item-bundle comparisons. The columns of A i (F) correspond to the items j, k, l, and the item pairs (kl), (jl), and (jk). The first and last rows of A i (F) yield Equations 1 and 14, respectively. Note that each item and item bundle have separate, person-specific scale values. However, because the matrix A i (F) is not of full rank, one of the scale values can be set to an arbitrary constant. I refer to Equation 15 as the full model. This model serves as a benchmark for the additivity hypothesis, which specifies that item bundles are evaluated by additively combining the single-item scale values, that is,
In matrix notation, I obtain
The three columns of the design matrix A i (R) correspond to the items j, k, and l. Each of the rows of A i (R) contrast the separate items as well as the separate items and item bundles under the additivity hypothesis. For example, the last row of A i (R) corresponds to Equation 14 with the additional constraint given by Equation 16:
In contrast to A i
, A i (R) is of full-column rank. Thus, both the individual item scale values and their mean and covariance matrix can be estimated uniquely under the additivity hypothesis. By comparing the goodness-of-fit statistics under the full model with the ones obtained under the additivity model, we can determine rigorously whether the additivity representation is in agreement with the data. An illustrative application of this approach is presented next.
Additivity of Values in Interpersonal Attraction
As an illustration of the item-bundling approach, a study was conducted in which 171 undergraduate economics students at a Dutch university were asked which value or value combinations they were attracted to when forming a relationship with another person. The values, taken from S. H. Bilsky (1987, 1990) , were stimulation [S] ("looking for excitement, novelty, and challenges in life"), self-direction [D] ("exhibiting independent thought and action"), and achievement [A] ("achieving personal success through the demonstration of competence") (see Figure 1) .
Students compared the three pairs that can be formed on the basis of the single value and the three combinations of value pairs and single values. For example, in a comparison of stimulation with (self-direction, achievement), the respondents indicated whether they are more attracted to persons who are looking for excitement, novelty, and challenges in their life than to persons who exhibited independent thought and action and achieved personal success through the demonstration of competence.
The three values, stimulation, self-direction, and achievement, selected here serve predominantly individual interest and should not be in conflict with each other. Thus, it was expected that mean evaluations of item pairs exceed or are equal to the sum of the individual item evaluations in the interpersonal attraction study.
A direct inspection of the data does not provide unambiguous information about the degree to which the additivity hypothesis is consistent with the data. It was found that 65% and 61% of the respondents preferred self-direction and achievement over stimulation, respectively. A larger percentage of respondents (67%) preferred the item bundle (self-direction, achievement) over stimulation. However, the value pair (stimulation, self-direction) was preferred by a smaller number of respondents (46%) over achievement than observed in a comparison between the single value items self-direction and achievement (51%). Thus, pairing two items may increase or decrease their joint attractiveness relative to their separate evaluations.
For a formal test of the additivity hypothesis, the data were analyzed with the freely available computer program MIXOR (Hedeker & Gibbons, 1996) . Using numerical integration, this program facilitates computing maximumlikelihood estimates for the two-level Thurstonian and Bradley-Terry-Luce models. What is important to note is that this program allows for different within-pair variances under the Thurstonian model and provides log-likelihood statistics for model tests. Appendix B, which is available on the Web at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.9.4.453 .supp, contains a description of the program for estimating Equation 17, which is referred to as Model (c) in the subsequent sections.
As a first step, the Thurstonian paired comparison model was applied to test whether the within-pair variances were the same in each of the comparisons. In none of the tests could the null-hypothesis be rejected. As a result, the following test results are based on models with jk 2 ϭ j(kl) 2 ϭ 2 ϭ 1 for all item comparisons. Results for the full model and various special cases including the additivity model are listed in Table 1 . This table contains the models' deviance statistics; the number of estimated random and fixed parameters; and the likelihood ratio test results, G 2 , which compare the observed and expected frequencies under the estimated models. Model (a) is given by Equation 15. This model estimates the mean and covariance matrix for the single items and item bundles. Because one of the item bundles is selected as a reference category, the estimation of a (5 ϫ 5) covariance matrix and five item means is required. The fit of this model is satisfactory but requires a large number of parameters. Out of 64 possible response patterns, only 29 are observed in this data set. As a result, the goodness-of-fit statistic G 2 should be treated with caution, although the test statistic is still useful for model comparisons.
The remaining models in Table 1 contain special cases of Model (a). Model (b) contains the same fixed effects as Model (a); however, the random effects are estimated under the additivity design matrix A given in Equation 17. Thus, instead of 15, only 6 (co)variance terms need to be estimated. The design matrix for the fixed and random effects of Model (c) is given by Equation 17. Model (d) is a special case of Model (c) with equal variances for the three items, which reduces the total number of variance components to be estimated by 2.
There is little evidence to suggest that the additivity hypothesis should be rejected in this application. Comparisons between Models (a) and (b) as well as between Models (b) and (c) indicate that the additivity hypothesis cannot be rejected for the random or fixed effects, respectively. Because Model (d) yields almost the same fit statistic as Model (c), we also conclude that the hypothesis of equal item variances for the three items is in agreement with the data.
Parameters of Model (d) and their standard errors are given in Table 2 . Not surprisingly, the elements of ⍀ are estimated with little precision. Both the sample size and the number of items are too small for a precise determination of the (co)variance components. However, it is clear that the between-judges variance is much larger than the within-pair variance, which indicates that the respondents in this study were almost perfectly consistent in their evaluation of the items but also exhibited considerable individual differences. The preference ordering of the items (from most to least preferred) is self-direction, achievement, and stimulation. It is interesting that, in contrast to the first two items, the estimated mean evaluation of stimulation is negative, which indicates that the respondents do not view this item as a value characteristic that attracts them to another person. The negative mean evaluation of the stimulation item explains the seemingly paradoxical result that a smaller number of respondents prefer the item bundle (stimulation, self-direction) over achievement than the single item selfdirection over achievement. There appears to be a significant positive correlation between stimulation and selfdirection These results are in agreement with the circumplex model, proposed by Bilsky (1987, 1990) , which puts stimulation in close proximity to both self-direction and achievement. According to Schwartz and Bilsky's representation, the latter two items are more distant from each other, which is also consistent with the obtained correlational result ͩ DA ϭ .9 11.7 ϭ .08 ͪ .
In conclusion, this small scale study yielded a number of interesting results. First, the additivity hypothesis appears to be in good agreement with the paired comparison judgments. As a result, the full covariance matrix ⍀ and all of the item means could be estimated, which greatly simplified the interpretation of the results. Second, as a substantive conclusion, two of the value items were perceived as desirable and one value item was perceived as an undesirable characteristic in bonding with another person. It would not have been possible to obtain this result solely on a comparison of single items because in this case the origin of the item scale is not identified.
Discussion
In recent years, it has become a commonly accepted result of psychological research on values, attitudes, and preferences that seemingly minor changes in the phrasing of a question or in the presentation format can lead to dramatic changes in the response behavior of a person (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; N. Schwarz, 1996) . The traditional assumption that respondents have well-defined preferences, attitudes, and values has taken on the status of a hypothesis that has to be tested as part of any modeling efforts. As shown by Böckenholt (2001) , two-level models for comparative judgments provide a flexible and general framework for such investigations and any subsequent investigations of individual differences in item assessments.
Despite their advantages, comparative judgment methods are applied less frequently than absolute measures. One reason for the underutilization of comparative measures is that they lack information about the scale origin, which reduces by one the dimensionality of the individual-differences space. As a result, the analysis and interpretation of individual differences is more complicated for comparative than absolute methods. This article demonstrated that under certain conditions it is possible to overcome this limitation and to recover the full individual-differences space from comparative judgments alone. Table 3 lists the proposed approaches and the additional information that is needed to estimate the means and covariances of the J items. The first approach analyzes absolute and relative judgments jointly to identify the scale origin. This approach facilitates testing whether items are evaluated differently depending on whether they are compared to other items or to rating scale labels (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) . Any disagreements between absolute and comparative judgments can be diagnosed by testing whether item differences based on absolute judgments are equal to item differences based on comparative judgments as specified by Equation 9. The other two proposals are based exclusively on comparative judgments. The status quo approach requires that a natural zero point can be defined a priori. Especially when uncertainty plays an integral role in the evaluation of items, such a definition can be implemented easily. Potential fields of applications include choices among (medical) treatment plans, insurance policies, and options with future outcomes. In the selected application, the scale origin can be identified provided respondents follow the expected utility calculus and their item evaluations do not depend on whether they are presented in a risky or nonrisky choice mode.
The item-bundling approach provides valuable insights on the joint evaluation of items. The scale origin can be identified when item bundles are evaluated as an additive function of the separate item evaluations. In an investigation of interpersonal values, this method was used to estimate the origin of a value scale. We could identify desirable and undesirable values as well as their full covariance matrix on the basis of difference judgments. Although the reported application focused on conditions when evaluation rules are noninteractive, it should be noted that tests of more complex composition rules (Krantz & Tversky, 1971) can be performed in a similar fashion by following the approach presented here.
It should be stressed that each of these approaches is based on assumptions about the underlying judgment process that go beyond the basic representation given by Equation 1. These conditions may not be satisfied in any given application. For example, absolute and relative judgments may focus on different item features, item features may be evaluated differently depending on whether the choice mode is risky or nonrisky, and the overall evaluation of an item bundle may not an be additive function of the separate item evaluations. Fortunately, these violations can be tested statistically, and several procedures tests were proposed to examine whether the specified conditions are satisfied. Thus, the identification of a scale origin is best viewed as a hypothesis whose adequacy has to be examined before the full mean and covariance structure of the items can be estimated.
Tests of the hypotheses were presented in the form of a full and a reduced design matrix that coded the comparison between the items or item bundles. Because maximumlikelihood methods are used in estimating the models, difference chi-square tests can be applied to test each hypothesis. These tests are known to be more powerful than overall goodness-of-fit tests (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) . Simulation studies indicate that adequate parameters estimates, standard errors, and goodness-of-fit tests can be obtained for Thurstonian paired models with seven items and as few as 100 observations (Maydeu-Olivares, 2003) . Models with fewer items can be fit with even smaller sample sizes.
Taken together, the three presented approaches provide researchers with much flexibility in estimating the full itemcovariance matrix of the judgments. As a result, the issue of whether absolute or relative judgments should be collected in a psychological investigation may have lost much of its importance. Instead, psychological studies may profit more from combining both response-elicitation techniques to better understand the cognitive processes that lead to the observed judgments and choices.
